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Estrin Construction Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.1
Estrin was hired as a general contractor to build a warehouse according
to the specifications of architect Morris. It subcontracted with Keystone
Masonry for the steel and masonry work on the walls. It insured against
builders risk with Home Insurance (Home) and against general liability with
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna). During construction, heavy
winds collapsed portions of the walls. Estrin submitted a claim for damages
to Home, which paid $26,500. Home then sued architect Morris and sub-
contractor Keystone to recover the amount paid, asserting its rights as
subrogee under the builders risk policy. 2
Morris impleaded Estrin based on an indemnification clause in their con-
tract. Estrin tendered its defense to Aetna, which denied coverage and refused
to defend. Estrin hired private counsel, successfully defended the suit, and
then sued Aetna to recover the costs of the defense plus the statutory penalty
for vexatious nonpayment. 3
The issue at trial was whether two exclusions in the comprehensive liabil-
ity policy precluded Estrin's cause of action. One exclusion exempted from
coverage damage caused by accident if the insured or an indemnitee was
an architect.4 The other exclusion exempted "property owned or occupied
by... the Insured" or in the "care, custody, or control of the Insured." 5
The trial court found these provisions to be unambiguous and not subject
to construction. 6 The court then found that Morris, the indemnitee, was
an architect within the meaning of the indemnitee exclusion and that, at the
1. 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. App., W.D. 1981).
2. Id. at 415.
3. Id. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 375.420(1978 &Cum. Supp. 1981) (10 or20%
increase in damages).
4. The full exclusion provides as follows:
This endorsement does not apply:
(a) if the Insured or indemnitee is an architect [and] injury... or destruc-
tion aris[es] out of defects in maps, plans, designs or specifications
prepared, acquired or used by the Insured or indemnitees.
612 S.W.2d at 415 (brackets in original).
5. Id.
6. The trial court followed the traditional plain meaning approach to in-
surance contract interpretation. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text infra.
1
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time of the accident, Estrin occupied and controlled the damaged property.
Therefore, the exclusions precluded Estrin's cause of action.
7
On appeal to the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District,
Estrin asserted that the policy exclusions were ambiguous, requiring applica-
tion of the rule of insurance contract construction that favors coverage over
exclusion.8 Aetna countered that the policy provision was unambiguous and
not subject to construction. 9 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that
Aetna was excluded from defense of the third party petition on the basis of the
"care, custody, or control" exclusion,' 0 but not by the indemnitee exclusion."1
The decision to relieve Aetna of liability comports with Missouri case law,
1 2
but in reaching this result, the court modified Missouri's version of the
reasonable expectations approach to insurance contract interpretation.
1 3
There are three major approaches to the interpretation of contracts. The
first, the plain meaning rule, and its converse, the reasonable interpretations
rule, effect the intent of the parties as evidenced by their agreement, the
written contract.' 4 The other two approaches, judicial construction and un-
conscionability, are aimed at fairness.' 5
The plain meaning rule searches for ambiguity in the agreement.
1 6
Underlying this approach is the belief that courts should not interfere with
7. 612 S.W.2d at 415-16.
8. This rule is based on the general policy that courts abhor forfeitures. A
contrary rule would work forfeitures because the purpose of the insurance contract,
compensation of the insured, would be defeated. A New Approach For the Interpreta-
tion of Insurance Contracts, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 140, 143 & n.28 (1981).
Missouri courts generally interpret contracts in light of their purpose. See, e.g.,
Wilshire Constr. Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 463 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Mo. 1971).
9. 612 S.W.2d at 417. This is the plain meaning rule. See notes 16-20 and
accompanying text infra.
10. 612 S.W.2d at 429.
11. Id. at 416. The court explained that the duty of the insurer to defend
depends on whether the allegations of the petition state a claim within the policy
coverage. Id. (citing Zipkin v. Freeman, 436 S.W.2d 753,754 (Mo. En Banc 1969)).
Count one of the third party petition alleged negligence on the part of the architect,
something that did not fall within the indemnitee exclusion. Aetna was thus not
excused from the defense under that exclusion. Id.
12. Moore v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 422 S.W.2d 357,359 (Mo. App., K.C.
1967); Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haglund, 387 S.W.2d 230, 233-34 (Mo.
App., K.C. 1965).
13. See generally Perlet, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of Reasonable Ex-
pectation, 6 FORUM 116 (1971).
14. See 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 8, at 143.
15. SeeU.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (purpose of unconscionability doctrine is
prevention of oppression and unfair surprise); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and
Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 562 (1971) (courts
strain to construe contracts when they find unfair term).
16. J. CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3-9 (1977); In-
surance Contracts: Diverse Judicial Approaches for Determining Ambiguity in Missouri, 46
[Vol. 47
2
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contracts made by private parties.1 7 If the provision in question is unam-
biguous, extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract is inadmissible in the
absence of fraud,1 8 duress,' 9 or mutual mistake. 20 The court must apply the
terms as written. The reasonable interpretations approach, on the other hand,
is founded on the belief that if contract language is ambiguous, courts must
intervene to determine the parties' intent. 21 If the language is reasonably
susceptible to more than one meaning, it is subject to construction. Extrin-
sic evidence may be admitted to help determine the intent of the parties, 22
and the court interprets the terms in light of that evidence.
With the advent of standard form and adhesion contracts, the second
major approach to contract interpretation emerged: judicial construction.
This doctrine is result-oriented; 23 if the court determines that a contract pro-
vision is unfair, it finds the provision to be ambiguous and subject to
construction. 24 Many commentators have criticized this doctrine because
it chooses a result without regard to the words used by the parties.
25
Under both the reasonable interpretations approach and the judicial con-
struction doctrine, the court will apply rules of construction, which usually
favor the insured, to ambiguous terms. These rules are based on the policy
MO. L. REV. 447,450 & nn. 12-14 (1981). To determine whether a contract is am-
biguous, the disputed language will be examined in the context of the entire agree-
ment. It is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible of more than one construction
when the words are given their plain and ordinary meanings. Universal Towing
Co. v. United Barge Co., 579 F.2d 1098, 1101 (8th Cir. 1978).
17. See H.K. Porter Co. v. Wire Rope Corp., 367 F.2d 653, 660 (8th Cir.
1966); 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 8, at 143.
18. See Hudspeth v. Zorn, 292 S.W.2d 271, 275-76 (Mo. 1956).
19. See Aurora Bank v. Hamlin, 609 S.W.28 486, 488 (Mo. App., S.D. 1980).
20. See Czarnecki v. Phillips Pipe Line Co., 524 S.W.2d 153, 156-57 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1975).
21. See Kyte v. Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos., 549 S.W.2d 366, 367-68 (Mo.
App., Spr. 1977); 46 MO. L. REV., supra note 16, at 451 & nn.15-16.
22. The reasonable interpretations approach is an attempt to reconcile the
strict plain meaning rule with the rules of construction that favor the insured; it
tries to balance contract language against fairness to the parties. See 46 Mo. L.
REV., supra note 16, at 451 & nn. 15-16; 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV., supra note 8,
at 143.
23. Slawson, supra note 15, at 562.
24. Ambiguity in this context can be defined as a lack of notice to the weaker
party that the contract favors the drafter and is, therefore, unfair. Kamarck, Open-
ing the Gate: The Steven Case and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 153, 159 (1977).
25. Slawson, supra note 15, at 562. Professor Keeton does not favor judicial
construction because it creates confusion and implies that the courts are prejudiced
against insurers. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights At Variance with Policy Provisions, 83
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that contracts should be construed in favor of the party who had little or no
opportunity to choose the terms of the contract. 26 They are recognized in
the majority of jurisdictions. 27
The third major approach to contract interpretation, unconscionability,
also dictates a result based on fairness. Both the Uniform Commercial Code28
and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 9 use unconscionability. The doc-
trine allows courts to police contracts and refuse to enforce terms that they
find unfair.3 0 This approach is preferable to the judicial construction doc-
trine because it allows the courts to attack the problem directly, without us-
ing the pretense of construction.3 1
These traditional approaches are abandoned by the Estrin court. Judge
Shangler, writing for the court, modified Missouri's implementation of the
reasonable expectations doctrine. About one-third of the states recognize
this doctrine, but the majority, which prior to Estrin included Missouri,32
26. One commentator suggests, however, that rules of construction in favor
of the insured should be applied only if the ambiguous contract term is unfair. A
term is unfair if it defeats the reasonable expectations of a party because the pro-
tection of expectations induced by agreements is the purpose of contract law. 3 A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559 (1960).
27. 46 MO. L. REV., supra note 16, at 448 n.6. Seegenerally3 A. CORBIN, supra
note 26, 5 559.
28. U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
(1 ) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the contract
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause so as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial set-
ting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) provides:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is
made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the re-
mainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit
the application of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
Id. comment a provides, "The determination that a contract or term is or is not
unconscionable is made in the light of its setting, purpose and effect."
30. For cases applying U.C.C. § 2-302, seegenerally 2 U.C.C. CASE DIGEST
§§ 2302.1-.34 (1979).
31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §.208 comment a (1981)
("Particularly in the case of standardized agreements, the rule of this Section per-
mits the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or clause rather
than to avoid unconscionable results by interpretation.").
32. See Bennett v. American Life & Accident Ins. Co., 495 S.W.2d 753, 758
(Mo. App., St. L. 1973).
4
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requires ambiguity before the doctrine may be applied.3 3 By not requiring
ambiguity, Estrin marks a repudiation of the majority approach.
The reasonable expectations doctrine is based on the adhesive nature
of insurance contracts.3 4 The court recognizes that adhesion contracts are
not per se unenforceable because they permit lower transaction costs in a
mass consumer society.3 5 The need for them, however, does not change their
adhesive nature, and they should be subject to rigorous scrutiny. Adhesion
contracts are not the result of negotiations between equals. One party makes
the terms and the other adheres to them with little or no choice. 36 The
reasonable expectations of parties in this unequal bargaining position must
be honored to ensure that enforcement is consistent with the adherent's in-
tent. Courts must determine this intent from the circumstances of the trans-
action, even if the written words of the contract are not ambiguous.
37
As the Estrin court explained, the reasonable expectations approach
focuses on the expectations of a reasonable person in the place of the
adherent. 38 It is an objective standard that does not guarantee construction
in favor of the insured.3 9 In applying this standard, courts may consider any
extrinsic evidence that may help them to determine the reasonable expec-
tations of the parties: ambiguity of the language, general knowledge of con-
33. A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations as Applied to In-
surance Contracts, 13 J.L. REFORM 603, 609 n.22, 611 n.29 (1980). For the historical
development of the reasonable expectations approach, see Perlet, supra note 13,
at 117.
34. For a general discussion of adhesion contracts in this setting, see 612
S.W.2d at 418 n.3.
35. Id. at 422. One commentator notes that individualized contracts would
not be beneficial to the consumer because he would have to pay to have the con-
tract negotiated. The benefits obtained can be acquiredless expensively. Slawson,
supra note 15, at 531.
36. 612 S.W.2d at 422.
37. Id. at 421. As authority for this proposition, the court cites, but does not
discuss, a leading decision that explains the doctrine of reasonable expectations,
C &J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). In
C &JFertilizer, the plaintiff's plant was burglarized. The plaintiff was insured by
the defendant under two policies, both of which required visible marks of entry
before a claim for stolen property would be paid. No visible marks within the mean-
ing of the policy were found at the plaintiff's plant, although the door of the building.
had been forced open. Id. at 171. The plaintiff sued to recover the amount lost in
the burglary. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the plaintiff could not reasonably
expect the exclusion of property taken by actual burglary from coverage in a theft
policy. Id. at 176-77. This case illustrates the necessity of determining the intent
of the parties before construing a contract and the danger in applying the plain
meaning rule, which can frustrate the intent of the parties.
38. 612 S.W.2d at 423.
39. Id. at 420. See, e.g., Central Bearings Co. v. Wolverine Ins. Co., 179
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tent, and whether the policyholder read or had the opportunity to read the
language.40 If the court finds that the term does not meet the expectations
of a reasonable person in the position of the insured, it is unfair and subject
to corrective judicial power. 41
In applying this standard, the Estrin court looked to the reasonable ex-
pectations of the usual general contractor because the plaintiff was a member
of this class. 42 The court then used comment f of section 211 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts43 as its test for unfairness and found that the
Aetna provision was not unfair.
4 4
The court next recognized that the term still could be unfair if it
eliminated the dominant purpose of the contract. 45 The court found that in
policies like Aetna's, it is reasonably expected that the property and person
of the insured are not protected, since the dominant purpose is to protect
others against loss. 46 Therefore, the exclusion did not impair the dominant
purpose of the contract. Further, the court found that the walls under con-
struction were in the "care, custody or control" of Estrin when the damage
occurred. 47 The property damage was excluded from coverage under the
40. 612 S.W.2d at 426.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 427.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment f (1981),
provides:
A party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does not as-
sent to a term if the other party has reason to believe that the adhering party
would not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the agree-
ment contained the particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be
shown by the prior negotiations or inferred . . . from the fact that it
eviscerates the nonstandard terms explicitly agreed to, or from the fact that
it eliminates the dominant purpose of the transaction.
Keeton advocates an approach similar to that of the Restatement (Second) of Con-
tracts. See Keeton, supra note 25, at 968. This approach is not unfair to insurers
because they know that policyholders ordinarily will not read their policies, pro-
bably because of the complicated language. It is unfair to give effect to a harsh clause,
no matter how plain and clear the language, because the policyholder usually makes
the contract before he even has a chance to see it. Id. Keeton also suggests that in-
surance companies may make an explicit term effective if they call it to the atten-
tion of the policyholder. He bases this idea on an analogy to the limitations on inn-
keeper liability. Id.
44. The court here equates an expected term with a fair one. In this view, an
unexpected term is unreasonable and, therefore, unfair. 612 S.W.2d at 426.
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment f(1981).
46. 612 S.W.2d at 427.
47. In applying this clause to the facts, the court interpreted "control" to mean
physical control, i.e., possessory rather than proprietary control. Relying on Kirch-
ner v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 440 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Mo. App., K.C.
1969), the court also required physical control at the time the loss occurred. 612
S.W.2d at 428-29. These are standard interpretations of the care, custody, or con-
[Vol. 47
6




The supreme court's adoption of the Estrin approach to adhesion con-
tracts could have far-reaching effects on the law in Missouri because adhesion
contracts are widely used. 49 Although the reasonable expectations doctrine
may be an aid to Missouri courts,5 0 perhaps those courts should revise the
more traditional unconscionability approach, 51 rather than adopt a new ap-
proach in an already confused area of the law. In the area of insurance con-
tract interpretation, it is difficult to be certain which approach a court will
use in analyzing a contract. 52 Similarly, legal scholars are in disagreement
about which approach to use. 53 The law of contract interpretation is in a
state of confusion, and the adoption of a new approach may only add fur-
ther unpredictability. 54
trol clause. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1242, 1243-51 (1958).
Although the court relied on Kirchner to interpret the clause, it distinguished that
case on the basis of the relationship between the builder and the damaged property.
612 S.W.2d at 428. In Kirchner, the insured was a subcontractor who had little con-
trol of the construction process; the court found that he lacked the necessary con-
trol of the property. 440 S.W.2d at 757. By contrast, Estrin was a general contrac-
tor who was required by contract to supervise the job and to protect the property
during construction. The court also found that Estrin had control at the time the
damage occurred because the contract vested responsibility for the project in him.
Such responsibility was "tantamount to a right of possession until the construc-
tion was completed." 612 S.W.2d at 429.
48. 612 S.W.2d at 429.
49. A. CORBIN, supra note 26, § 559 (Supp. 1980). The fate of insurance con-
tract interpretation may suggest the future of all adhesion contracts. Holmes, Is
There Life After Gilmore's Death of Contract?-Inductions From a Study of Commercial Good
Faith in First-Party Insurance Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330, 345 (1980).
50. Some commentators do favor the reasonable expectations approach. See
Kamarck, supra note 24, at 159-65. See generally Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in
the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275 (1976). Others believe that the doctrine can be
beneficial if applied only in cases where ambiguity has been found. See generally
Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expec-
tations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151 (1981); 13J.L. REFORM, supra note 33.
51. For a discussion of unconscionability in insurance contract interpretation,
see Anderson, Life Insurance Conditional Receipts andJudicial Intervention, 63 MARQ.
L. REV. 593, 603-04 (1980).
52. See generally 46 MO. L. REV., supra note 16.
53. Id. at 449 n.l1.
54. See generally Squires, A Skeptical Look at the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations,
6 FORUM 252 (1971). It should also be noted that reasonable expectations may
overlap with unconscionability. One purpose of U.C.C. § 2-302 is to prevent un-
fair surprise. A term is not unfairly surprising if the party reasonably should have
known and understood it. Comment, Bargaining Power and Unconscionability: A Sug-
gested Approach to UCC Section 2-302, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 998, 999 (1966). This
analysis does not differ greatly from that of the reasonable expectations test, although
an objective standard may be applied more readily in the latter case.
7
Matteuzzi: Matteuzzi: Reasonable Expectations Approach to Insurance Contract
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Moreover, any new approach should be both clearly formulated and easy
to apply.55 Unfortunately, the reasonable expectations doctrine may not be
ajudicially manageable approach. Professor Keeton, who strongly advocates
the doctrine, concedes that it is "too general to serve as a guide from which
particularized decisions can be derived through an exercise of logic, and too
broad to be universally true .... ,,56 This vagueness is apparent in Estrin.
The guidelines articulated by the court are contradictory. For example, the
court states that it must look at the reasonable expectations of the mass of
adherents to a particular contract.5 7 Yet, in applying this objective standard,
the court properly may consider whether the insured in a particular case has
read the policy language. These statements are inconsistent; one disregards
the subjective expectations of the particular policyholder while the other takes
his subjective knowledge into account.5" Surely the subjective knowledge
of the particular policyholder has no bearing on the reasonable expectations
of the mass of adherents. It seems that the criteria for applying the doctrine
must be clarified if it is to be workable. The absence of such a clear exposi-
tion may lead to unclear and inconsistent judicial opinions.5 9
If the Missouri courts wish to adopt a new approach to insurance con-
tract interpretation, it seems preferable to revise the doctrine of unconscion-
ability. This approach is alluded to by Judge Shangler in his dissenting opin-
ion in Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. King Louie International, Inc. 60 As he
explained in that case, the current unconscionability doctrine in Missouri
has two prongs, one procedural and one substantive. Procedural unconscion-
ability refers to abuse in the contract formation process and focuses on high
pressure salesmanship, fine print, misrepresentation, and unequal bargain-
ing power.61 Substantive unconscionabiity refers to the resulting harsh and
unreasonable terms of the contract. 62
Because a contract must be both substantively and procedurally uncon-
scionable before a court will declare a term unconscionable, 63 the doctrine
usually is limited to cases in which one party is clearly in a stronger bargaining
position. 64 Unconscionability, therefore, does not apply to many business
55. Comment, supra note 54, at 999.
56. Keeton, supra note 25, at 967.
57. 612 S.W.2d at 426.
58. For a discussion of the difficulty involved in applying the reasonable ex-
pectations doctrine, see Squires, supra note 54, at 252.
59. See Kelso, Idaho and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations: A Springboardfor
an Analysis of a New Approach to a Valuable But Often Misunderstood Doctrine, 47 INS.
COUNS.J. 325, 330 (1980).
60. 597 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
61. Id. at 648 (Shangler, J., dissenting). See Leff, Unconscionabiliy and the
Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 489-508 (1967).
62. 597 S.W.2d at 648.
63. Id. It should be noted that a sliding scale is used when applying the two
prongs. If the terms created by the contract are very oppressive, then the contract
process need be only slightly abusive. Id. at 634.
64. See, e.g., Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int'l, Inc., 597
:,584 [Vol. 47
8
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transactions between parties of equal sophistication. Nonetheless, these con-
tracts still may be unfair because the adherent, as in Estrin, may have little
or no choice but to accept the terms offered. 65 Although the Estrin plaintiff
could have rejected Aetna's terms and insured with another company, the
standard form terms probably would have been the same. Unconscionability,
however, could not be applied in Estrin, even if the terms were unfair, because
there was no procedural unconscionability. To remedy this situation,
Missouri courts need only abandon the procedural prong of the unconscion-
ability doctrine. 66 Courts could then focus on whether the contract was harsh
or unreasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances. 67 This would
be a more equitable and predictable approach to the interpretation of in-
surance contracts.
68
The Estrin court's advocacy of the reasonable expectations approach is
an attempt to establish a fair approach to insurance contract interpretation.
Unfortunately, the vague nature of this doctrine may cause further confu-
sion. It would be advisable for the Missouri courts to focus on the improve-
ment of an existing doctrine, unconscionability, to reconcile the public's need
for adhesion contracts, the inherent unfairness of such contracts, and the
intent of the parties.
NANCY E. MATTEUZZI
S.W.2d 624 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979); USA Chem, Inc. v. Lewis, 557 S.W.2d 15
(Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
65. 597 S.W.2d at 648.
66. One commentator suggests that the abandonment of the procedural aspect
of unconscionability would help to clarify the application of U.C.C. § 2-302. See
Leff, supra note 61, at 496.
67. This is basically the approach thatJudge Shangler takes in Estrin. He seems
to use the term "reasonable expectations" as a disguise for substantive unconscion-
ability. It is interesting to note that when using the term "substantive unconscion-
ability," he was forced to write a dissenting opinion, see 597 S.W.2d at 624
(Shangler, J., dissenting), yet when using the term "reasonable expectations," he
received unanimous support, see 612 S.W.2d at 413.
68. This approach also would harmonize the application of U.C.C. § 2-302
with the intent of Karl Llewellyn, one of the Code's draftsmen. See Spanogle, Analyz-
ing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 938-39 (1969). Llewellyn
believed that each form contract represented two separate contracts. One contained
the "dickered" terms, while the other contained the boilerplate terms supplied by
the drafter. In Llewellyn's view, any unreasonable or surprising terms found in
the boilerplate were not part of the overall contract; such terms were enforceable
only if reasonable. Id. Procedural unconscionability, in this view, is unnecessary
in order to invalidate an unreasonable term. The elimination of the procedural un-
conscionability requirement also seems consistent with the stated purpose of U.C.C.
§ 2-302: prevention of oppression and unfair surprise. Oppression may be inter-
preted to include terms with oppressive effects, regardless of procedural abuses.
Spanogle, supra, at 948. For a discussion of unfair surprise, see note 54 supra.
9
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